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1. Introduction
Since Taylor (1993) showed how a simple linear combination of ination and GDP devi-
ations from trend to some extent mimicked the path of the U.S. Federal Funds rate in
the period 1987Q1-92Q4, a voluminous literature has assessed monetary policy conduct
through what is now known as the Taylor rule. From a practical and normative perspec-
tive, policy deliberations in many central banks include the Taylor rule as a yardstick
for good policymaking.1 Also, theoretical research and model-based forecasting often use
Taylor-type rules as a default representation of monetary policymaking, or as a potential
approximation to optimal policy; see Galí (2008) for a recent textbook exposition.
An important characteristic of the rule is that the nominal interest rate should be
raised more than proportionally when ination raises this is often labelled an active
Taylor rule. This response is viewed as important, as it is conducive for ination stability.
For example, it precludes sun-spot-driven equilibria in forward-looking economies. The
empirical literature has thus often focused on whether the rule is active or not (e.g.,
Clarida et al., 2000).
The objective of this note is to assess whether the Taylor rule has had any relevance for
monetary policy in the Euro area since its inception in 1999. Our empirical evidence shows
that it has not. Despite the fact that ination stability is the primary objective of the
European Central Bank, the ECB has not responded systematically to ination. Instead,
the main determinant of interest-rate changes, within a class of simple response functions,
is economic activity, e.g., unemployment changes in the Euro area. We argue that this
does not need to be an indication of problematic monetary policy conduct neither in
terms of stability issues, nor in terms of optimality considerations.
2. Theory, estimation strategy and data
In our main formulation of a testable behavioral expression for the ECB, we follow the
literature and allow for the inclusion of expected future variables to capture potential
forward-looking aspects in monetary policy; see, e.g., Gerdesmeier and Ro¢ a (2006), Ger-
lach (2007) and Gerlach and Lewis (2010) for reviews of the empirical literature on ECB
behavior. A forward-looking Taylor-type setting of the target value for the nominal interest
1Asso et al. (2010) present an intriguing account of the history of the Taylor rule, and show how it
is mentioned several times in the transcripts of FOMC meetings. Also, in policy reports of the ination-
targeting Central Bank of Norway, the Taylor rule is mentioned as input to assessing the appropriate
interest rate; see Norges Bank (2010, pp. 2225).
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rate it , is usually modelled as:
it = +  (Ett+k   ) + Et
 
yt+h   ynt+h

+ x0t; (1)
where t in the ination rate,  is the goal value for ination, yt is output, ynt is the
natural rate of output, xt is a vector of other variables that may inuence interest-rate
setting, Et is the rational expectations operator conditional on information available in t,
and (; ; ; ; ) is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The specication allows
for both k > 0 and h > 0, i.e., that the ECB may respond to expectations about future
ination and the output gap. As is standard is the literature, autocorrelation in observed
nominal interest rates motivates estimation of a partial adjustment model:
it =
mX
j=1
jit j +
 
1 
mX
j=1
j
!
it + e"t; m > 0; (2)
where
Pm
j=1 j is interpreted as the degree of interest rate smoothing,and e"t is an i.i.d.
policy shock.
Initial examinations of (2) gave results that were very sensitive to specication. One
reason could be that data are nonstationary (or near integrated), which would render
parameter estimates spurious. Indeed, it is not possible to reject nonstationarity of most
of our variables; cf. the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests in our Supplementary Appendix
4. This property of data has been acknowledged in the empirical literature, but most
researchers nevertheless assess versions of (2) arguing that the unit-root tests have low
power in short samples. While we are sympathetic towards this argument, the di¢ culty
of obtaining robust results led us to estimate (2) in rst di¤erences, where data according
to the ADF tests are likely to be stationary.2 Thereby, we are unable to identify  and
, but as our interest is monetary policy responses at the business cycle frequency, lack
of identication of these long-run parameters is less important. In the case of m = 2 (the
highest value we found signicant), (2) then becomes
it = 1it 1 + 2it 2 + (1  1   2)it +e"t
2Christensen and Nielsen (2009) use co-integrating techniques in estimations of a Taylor-type rule on
US data. Österholm (2005) performs co-integration analysis on standard Taylor rules for US and other
countries. We have not pursued co-integration analysis here, as most theory does not envisage a Taylor
rule as a long-run representation of interest rate determination.
2
( is the di¤erencing operator), and thus by (1):
it = 1it 1 + 2it 2 + (1  1   2)

Ett+k + Et
 
yt+h   ynt+h

+ x0t

+e"t:
(3)
We estimate (3) by General Methods of Moments (Hansen, 1982) as the right-hand
side variables are endogenous and/or unknown in period t.3 Replacing expected values by
actual values, the relation becomes
it = 1it 1 + 2it 2 + (1  1   2) [t+k + yt+h + x0t] + "t; (4)
where "t  (1  1   2) (Ett+k   t+k)+(1  1   2) 
 
Etyt+h   yt+h   Etynt+h

+
e"t. (Note that the di¤erence specication avoids the problem of the unobserved natural
rate of output.) The parameter vector   (1; 2; ; ; ) is then identied using the
orthogonality, or, moment conditions, Et ["tzt] = 0, where zt is a vector of instrument
variables known in period t.4 The parameter vector is exactly identied when the number
of instrument variables match the number of parameters, but we use more instruments,
which allows for an evaluation of the validity of the specication and instruments by the
Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions. We use relatively small sets of instruments,
as it is well known that too many instruments makes it virtually impossible to reject
the validity of moment conditions. As instruments we use lags of the variables in the
equation with lag lengths suggested by the univariate pattern of autocorrelation. An
optimal weighting of moment conditions is adopted by an iterative procedure, and we
use Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent covariance estimators adopting the
Andrews-Monahan method with AR(1) pre whitening.5
We use monthly data covering the period from 1999m1 to 2010m1. As ECBs nominal
interest rate, we follow most empirical literature and use the Euro Overnight Index Average
(EONIA); cf. Gerdesmeier and Ro¢ a (2006) and Gerlach and Lewis (2010). As ination
we use the measure that is ECBs self-proclaimed goal variable, the rate of change in the
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). As output we use Euro-16 GDP, which,
3For estimation, we apply Michael T. Cli¤s MATLAB routines (Cli¤, 2003), which is kindly made
available at http://www.feweb.vu.nl/econometriclinks/mcli¤progs.html. Our programs and data are avail-
able upon request.
4All estimations involve a constant term (as do the vectors of instruments), which is ignored here and
in the ensuing tables as it is always insignicant.
5We have chosen this method over the Newey-West procedure with a Bartlett kernel, where the band-
width is to be chosen. First, Andrews and Monahan (1992) show that other HAC estimators bias t-statistics
upwards. Second, the signicance of some variables was sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. Hence, we
use Andrews and Monahans estimator which automatically determines the bandwidth so as to avoid
rejecting H0 hypotheses too often, and to avoid taking a stand on bandwidth choice.
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however, is only available on a quarterly basis. For the estimations, we therefore extract
monthly values by a cubic spline transformation. We subsequently consider specications
with unemployment, ut, as activity variable this data is available for Euro-16 at monthly
frequency.6 The Supplementary Appendix B contains full details on all data sources.
3. Results
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for (4) at various k  h. This choice of leads
are motivated by the conventional wisdom that monetary policy changes rst impact on
output and then later on ination. Apart from Hansens J-test, we also report the adjusted
R2 and the Ljung-Box Q-test for autocorrelation (up to, and including, 18 lags). These
diagnostics are not pertinent to GMM estimation (and note that a negative R2 is possible),
but we include them to give some information about the t and behavior of the residuals
of the estimated relations. The information set reects that HICP ination is only known
with a months lag and unemployment with two monthslag.
The estimations based on observable output reveal one consistent pattern, namely that
ination never enters signicantly (and only in the instance of a six month lead is the
estimated parameter value in conformity with an active Taylor rule). Output enters signif-
icantly in some instances, but the point estimates varies substantially across specications
(also, the specications su¤er from either autocorrelation of errors or high J-statistics).
The estimations based on expectations of current output, deliver strongly signicant es-
timates of , and the point estimates are quite similar across specications. Ination at
any horizon enters insignicantly. The specications including expected future output all
perform rather poorly. In the case where both output and ination are six-month ahead
expectations, we obtain a signicant estimate of the impact of ination. The point estimate
is very high, 3.23, but the specication su¤ers from strong autocorrelation in residuals,
and a lack of explanatory power. Also, in the other specications where ination enters as
six-month ahead expectations, point estimates are very di¤erent (0.41 and 1.58, respec-
tively). Finally, interest rate smoothing is virtually absent; some specications portray
a signicant impact of interest-rate changes two months before, but these mostly occurs
in specications where output and ination are insignicant. All in all, the most robust
nding is the signicant impact of current output changes on current interest-rate changes,
as well as the lack of any systematic e¤ect of HICP ination.
6Recent theory also emphasizes that unemployment is a relevant variable for monetary policy analysis;
see Blanchard and Galí (2010).
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Since the output measure is derived from quarterly data, we make the same estimations
in Table 2, except that output is replaced by unemployment for which we have monthly
data. The results qualitatively corroborate those presented in Table 1. Current unemploy-
ment has a strongly signicant impact on interest-rate setting, and the point estimates
are comparable to those obtained with output as the activity variable. (HICP ination
only enters signicantly in one specication; with a negative sign.) The results seem more
robust compared to those based on output when it comes to the validity of the moment
conditions. No matter at what horizon ination enters, the J-tests show that one cannot
reject the validity of the moment conditions when unemployment enters contemporane-
ously. Quantitatively, the results suggest that an increase in Euro-area unemployment
by 1 percentage point is met by a decrease in the short interest rate by over 100 basis
points. Again, consistent evidence on interest rate smoothing is hard to nd two-month
lagged interest-rate changes have signicant impact in some instances, but mostly when
unemployment enters at an insignicant lag or lead.
To further examine interest-rate setting, we run the regression with expected current
unemployment and HICP ination and add (rst di¤erences of) other macroeconomic
variables one at the time. In all cases, variables enter contemporaneously, and for those
that are endogenous or unobservable at t we add their lagged values to the instrument
set (the number of lags determined from univariate autoregressive properties). In each
case, we also present the results for the case where we eliminate the insignicant HICP
ination. Table 3 reports the results, where column  contains the estimated coe¢ cient to
the variable under consideration. Note that in the case without any additional variables,
the specication is virtually unchanged when HICP ination is removed from the equation.
Of some interest is the estimate of  when M3 growth is added. It is negative, and
signicantly so when ination is not included. This does not support that the ECB takes
money growth into account when evaluating inationary pressures, which contrasts with
its o¢ cial reliance of so-called monetary analysis (cf. Papademos and Stark, 2010).7
The price of oil enters signicantly and with the expected positive sign, but only in the
case where ination is absent (the magnitude is very modest though; a 50% increase
in the oil price leads to a 20 basis point nominal interest-rate increase). The ECBs
economic sentiment index enters signicantly with the expected sign inclusion of this
activity measure, however, do not rule out an independent response to unemployment
movements. Movements in exchange rates, Dollar/Euro rate or the e¤ective real Euro
7To be fair, this analysis emphasizes the medium-term evolution of money aggregates, and not their
business cycle component as we consider here.
7
Table 3: Adding other explanatory variables
1 2    R
2
J Q(18)
0.18 0.19 0.03 1.27z  0.45 2.85 22.76
None (0.11) (0.13) (0.41) (0.45) (0.72) (0.20)
0.20 0.20  1.38z  0.45 1.83 22.87
(0.12) (0.14) (0.34) (0.77) (0.20)
0.08 0.25 0.41 1.42y 0.22 0.29 4.94 23.88
M3 growth (0.15) (0.14) (0.29) (0.67) (0.16) (0.67) (0.16)
0.24 0.13  2.24z 0.31y 0.24 4.12 24.32
(0.15) (0.15) (0.49) (0.14) (0.66) (0.15)
0.17 0.17 0.24 1.24z 0.003 0.47 4.12 27.56
Oil price (0.09) (0.11) (0.30) (0.35) (0.004) (0.66) (0.07)
0.15 0.22y  1.34z 0.005y 0.48 3.24 27.51
(0.10) (0.10) (0.25) (0.002) (0.66) (0.07)
0.16 0.15 0.00 1.55z 0.036z 0.47 7.70 25.26
Economic senti- (0.10) (0.13) (0.37) (0.45) (0.012) (0.17) (0.12)
ment index 0.11 0.18  1.57z 0.037z 0.47 6.27 24.28
(0.10) (0.12) (0.24) (0.012) (0.18) (0.14)
0.14 0.20 0.11 1.30z 0.009 0.45 2.19 22.74
Dollar/Euro (0.19) (0.11) (0.36) (0.49) (0.029) (0.82) (0.20)
exchange rate 0.19 0.17  1.52z 0.008 0.45 1.38 22.97
(0.13) (0.13) (0.42) (0.037) (0.85) (0.19)
0.14 0.20 0.16 1.24z 0.087 0.19 1.03 19.55
Real e¤ective (0.13) (0.16) (0.42) (0.53) (0.083) (0.96) (0.36)
exchange rate 0.11 0.22  1.15z 0.076 0.30 1.18 18.33
(0.12) (0.16) (0.41) (0.079) (0.88) (0.36)
0.19 0.15 0.18 1.46z 0.03 0.36 4.77 23.75
Long Euro- (0.12) (0.14) (0.28) (0.37) (0.31) (0.57) (0.16)
bond rate 0.20 0.22  1.29z 0.32 0.41 3.74 27.94
(0.13) (0.16) (0.39) (0.46) (0.59) (0.06)
0.19y 0.21y 0.20 1.19y 0.03 0.46 3.08 23.06
Lehman Brothers (0.08) (0.10) (0.38) (0.51) (0.07) (0.69) (0.19)
Dummy 1 0.19y 0.26z  1.15z 0.10 0.43 1.76 20.60
(0.09) (0.09) (0.41) (0.13) (0.78) (0.30)
0.20y 0.32y 0.18 0.97 1.55 0.51 2.38 28.89
Lehman Brothers (0.09) (0.13) (0.48) (0.55) (0.91) (0.79) (0.05)
Dummy 2 0.22y 0.32y  1.13z 1.87z 0.51 2.17 29.35
(0.10) (0.13) (0.43) (0.71) (0.71) (0.04)
0.03 0.32z 0.32 1.42z  0.17 4.61 23.20
None  (0.08) (0.12) (0.31) (0.47) (0.46) (0.18)
sample ends in 0.02 0.29y  1.49z  0.22 4.03 25.81
June 2008 (0.08) (0.13) (0.40) (0.40) (0.10)
Notes: See notes to Table 2 for estimation method. For further details, see Appendix A.
ySignicant at the 5% level. zSignicant at the 1% level.
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rate, are not found to have any impact on interest-rate setting. The same applies for the
long (10 year) Euro bond rate.
As our sample includes data from one of the most turbulent economic periods in recent
decades, the nancial crisis that erupted in the Fall of 2008, it is of concern to assess
whether our main results are dependent on this event. Indeed many of the larger swings
in the nominal interest rate occur during the crisis. This issue has recently been addressed
by Gerlach and Lewis (2010) who estimate a Taylor-rule model allowing for endogenous
regime shifts. They use data in levels and nd a regime shift around September 2008.
This coincides with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers. We therefore introduce a dummy
capturing this shift. Dummy 1is results for the inclusion of a dummy that takes on zero
up until September 2008, one half in September 2008, and one afterwards (interestingly,
this crude dummy closely mimics the estimated indicator for regime shift in Gerlach and
Lewis, 2010). The dummy variable is insignicant. As we conduct estimations in rst
di¤erences, we also consider the dummy in di¤erences see the results for Dummy 2.
Here, the dummy is signicant when ination is not part of the equation (and has the
expected negative sign), but unemployment is still a signicant impetus for interest-rate
changes (note that this specication su¤ers from strong autocorrelation in errors). To
further examine the potential impact of the nancial crisis, we reestimate the basic equation
for a briefer sample ending in June 2008. As seen, the basic result stands unchanged.
Our main nding that unemployment, and not ination, drives interest-rate changes does
therefore not seem to be a result of the nancial crisis.
4. Discussion
The main objective of the ECB is price stability, and it has succeeded in achieving this
fairly well. Our results indicate that it is not caused by adherence to anything remotely
close to a Taylor rule during the past 11 years. This ts well with several ECB statements
(cf. Asso et al., 2010). Upon reection, it should not be a cause of concern either.
First, it is well established that what a central bank responds do not reveal its ultimate
motives. It may respond to certain variables because they are good indicators for its goal
variable(s). Such intermediate targeting is clearly what has driven the ECBs behavior.8
8This is also emphasized by Gerlach (2007). He considers the ECBs actual, and discrete, decisions
on changes in the repo rate in contrast with our focus on a target for the market-determined EONIA.
Nevertheless, our focus on interest rate changes makes our paper more related to his than to the large
level-estimation based literature. Interestingly, and in accordance with our ndings, Gerlachs ordered
probit analysis does not detect a notable inuence of ination per se on interest-rate decisions.
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Second, the failure of identifying an adherence to an active Taylor rule should not lead
to inference about potential stability problems in the Euro area. As one of us has em-
phasized elsewhere, empirical estimates are characterizations of equilibrium relationships
between macroeconomic variables. If these variables result from a central bank conducting
optimal monetary policy in a world that is (somewhat) forward looking, these equilibrium
relationships may exhibit small correlations between the nominal interest rate and ination.
Jensen (2009) presents estimations on simulated data from a small-scale New-Keynesian
model with optimal discretionary policymaking in a stable and fundamental-based equi-
librium. There, data looks as if an inactive Taylor rule has been followed. Furthermore,
if optimal policy is conducted under commitment, the central banks ability to a¤ect ex-
pectations causes the correlation between the nominal interest rate and ination to vanish
or even become negative in data at some horizon of ination expectations. Intuitively, if
a central bank can ght current ination by talking ination expectations down, the
current interest rate needs to be increased very little, and its equilibrium correlation with
ination expectations may become negative.
The lack of empirical identication of an active Taylor rule could therefore be seen as
an empirical sign of a credible ination-stabilizing central bank.
Appendix
A. Further details on Table 3
The instrument set for the basic equation is zut = f1;it 1;it 2;it 3;t 1;t 2;ut 2;
ut 3;ut 4;ut 5g. Let xt denote the rst di¤erence of an additional variable. Then,
the instrument sets for the estimations with additional variables are
Additional variable zt
M3 growth zut [ fxt 2;xt 3;xt 4g
Oil price zut [ fxt;xt 1g
Dollar/Euro exchange rate zut [ fxt 1g
Real e¤ective exchange rate zut [ fxt 1g
Long Euro-bond rate zut [ fxt 1;xt 2g
In the cases of the Economic sentiment indicator and Lehman Brothers dummies, zt =
zut [ xt. In each equation without HICP ination, zut is replaced by zut n ft 1;t 2g.
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B. Detailed data description
All data are available at www.ecb.int/stats/. The details of each series, and our treat-
ments, are:
EONIA:
O¢ cial description: Euro area (changing composition) - Money Market - Eonia rate -
Historical close, average of observations through period - Euro, provided by ECB. Percent
per annum
O¢ cial acronym: FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.MM.EONIA.HSTA
Our transformation of the raw data: None
HICP ination:
O¢ cial description: Euro area (changing composition) - HICP - Overall index, Annual
rate of change, Eurostat. Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted
O¢ cial acronym: ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.ANR
Our transformation of the raw data: None
Output:
O¢ cial description: Euro area 16 (xed composition) - Gross domestic product at market
price - Chain linked volumes, reference year 2000 - ECU/euro - Seasonally and partly
working day adjusted, mixed method of adjustment
O¢ cial acronym: ESA.Q.I5.S.0000.B1QG00.1000.TTTT.L.U.A
Our transformation of the raw data: Logarithm of quarterly data converted to monthly
data by cubic spline transformation
1
Unemployment:
O¢ cial description: Euro area 16 (xed composition) - Standardised unemployment, Rate,
Total (all ages), Total (male & female), Eurostat, Seasonally adjusted, not working day
adjusted, percentage of civilian workforce
O¢ cial acronym: STS.M.I5.S.UNEH.RTT000.4.000
Our transformation of the raw data: None
M3 growth:
O¢ cial description: Euro area (changing composition), Index of Notional Stocks, MFIs,
central government and post o¢ ce giro institutions reporting sector - Monetary aggregate
M3, All currencies combined - Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, Non-MFIs
excluding central government sector, Annual growth rate. Working day and seasonally
adjusted
O¢ cial acronym: BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.I.U2.2300.Z01.A
Our transformation of the raw data: None
Oil prices:
O¢ cial description: Brent crude oil 1-month Forward - free on board in US Dollar per
barrels; Financial market data type: Historical close, average of observations through
period
O¢ cial acronym: FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.CY.OILBRNI.HSTA
Our transformation of the raw data: 100 times the logarithm.
Economic sentiment indicator:
O¢ cial description: Euro area 16 (xed composition), EU Commission, DG-ECFIN, Eco-
nomic sentiment indicator, Total, Seasonally adjusted, not working day adjusted
O¢ cial acronym: SUR.M.I5.S.ECFIN.ESI000.TT
Our transformation of the raw data: 100 times the logarithm.
Dollar/Euro exchange rate:
O¢ cial description: ECB reference exchange rate, US dollar/Euro
O¢ cial acronym: EXR.M.USD.EUR.SP00.A
Our transformation of the raw data: 100 times the logarithm.
Real e¤ective exchange rate:
O¢ cial description: ECB Real e¤ective exchange rate CPI deated, Euro area-16 countries
vis-à-vis the EER-41 group of trading partners against Euro
O¢ cial acronym: EXR.M.Z60.EUR.ERC0.A
Our transformation of the raw data: 100 times the logarithm.
2
Long Euro-bond rate:
O¢ cial description: Euro area (changing composition) - Benchmark bond - Euro area 10-
year Government Benchmark bond yield - Yield - Euro, provided by ECB. Percent per
annum
O¢ cial acronym: FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.BB.U2_10Y.YLD
Our transformation of the raw data: None
C. Stationarity tests
Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics
Data in levels Data in rst
di¤erences
AR ARD AR ARD
EONIA interest rate 0.961 1.834 4.153z 4.147z
HICP-ination 0.865 2.516 9.249z 9.215z
Output gapa/growth 2.532y 2.571 3.031z 3.018y
Unemployment 0.057 2.464 2.628z 2.618
M3 growth 0.965 1.686 3.529z 3.553z
Oil priceb;c 0.795 1.474 3.116z 3.112y
Economic sentiments index 0.154 2.739 4.157z 4.139z
Dollar/Euro exchange rateb;c 0.432 1.547 1.958y 2.254
Real e¤ective exchange rateb 0.141 2.383 8.878z 8.847z
Long Euro-bond rate 0.294 1.988 9.106z 9.071z
Notes: ARdenotes autoregressive model, ARDdenotes autoregressive model with drift.
In each instance, the Bayesian Schwarz Information Criterion is used in determining
number of lags (18 is maximum number of lags).
aFor the level case, we use an output-gap measure constructed as HP-ltered GDP.
bThe Bayesian Schwarz Information Criterion chose the longest lag length for the
variable in levels.
cThe Bayesian Schwartz Information Criterion chose the longest lag length for the
variable in rst di¤erences. For lags up to at least 10, nonstationarity was strongly
rejected.
yRejects nonstationarity at the 5% signicance level. zRejects nonstationarity at the
1% signicance level.
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